State v. Thomas and the McDonough Test: A Safety Net Proposal to Cure the Square Peg-Round Hole Dilemma by Joner, Lisabeth
BYU Law Review
Volume 1993 | Issue 4 Article 6
11-1-1993
State v. Thomas and the McDonough Test: A Safety
Net Proposal to Cure the Square Peg-Round Hole
Dilemma
Lisabeth Joner
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisabeth Joner, State v. Thomas and the McDonough Test: A Safety Net Proposal to Cure the Square Peg-Round Hole Dilemma, 1993 BYU
L. Rev. 1347 (1993).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1993/iss4/6
State v. Thomas and the McDonough Test: 
A Safety Net Proposal to Cure the 
Square Peg-Round Hole Dilemma 
Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments t o  the Unit- 
ed States Constitution, criminal defendants are guaranteed due 
process of law, which includes the right to  trial by an impartial 
jury.' The voir dire process is one method by which our legal 
system attempts to empanel impartial jurors who will consider 
the accused innocent unless evidence presented in court proves 
otherwise. Any bias revealed by answers to voir dire question- 
ing can just* excusing a potential juror for cause.' A party 
suspecting bias may exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse 
a juror not excused for cause.3 
In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood: the 
United States Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to  
determine whether allegations of juror dishonesty during voir 
dire are sufficient to  warrant a new trial. To receive a new 
trial, "a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to an- 
swer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then fur- 
ther show that a correct response would have provided a valid 
basis for a challenge for cause." 
1. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV, $ 1. The Sixth Amendment states that "the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145, 149 (1968), the Supreme Court 
applied this right to state criminal proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause. Although the right to a jury trial applies only to criminal 
proceedings, see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984) (dictum), petty 
criminal offenses have been traditionally tried without juries. 
2. The requirements for challenges for cause in federal civil cases are delin- 
eated in 28 U.S.C. $ 1870 (1988). Utah's equivalent requirements for challenges for 
cause in state civil cases are stated in UTAH R. CIV. P. 47(f) (1993); challenges for 
cause in criminal cases are addressed in UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18(e) (1993). 
3. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a party need not provide a reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. Id. 
a t  220. Subsequent cases have since placed some restrictions on the use of peremp- 
tory challenges. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (disallowing pe- 
remptory challenges showing a pattern of racial discrimination). 
4. 464 U.S. 548 (1984). 
5. Id. at 556. 
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In State v. T h o m ~ s , ~  a Utah criminal case, the McDonough 
test was applied7 to determine whether "the failure of two ju- 
rors to disclose their prior experiences deprived [the defendant] 
of his constitutional right to an impartial jury and a fair tri- 
aY8 During deliberation, other jurors learned of their fellow 
jurors' nondisclosures during the voir dire process. The court 
was forced to decide whether the jury's deliberative process 
should be examined in  determining whether the jurors' 
nondisclosures had resulted in prejudice related to their mis- 
conduct at voir dire.g Unable to command a majority, three of 
the five Utah Supreme Court justices wrote separate opinions 
which concurred in granting a new trial, but differed in reason- 
ing and analysis.1° 
Thomas illustrates the malleability of the McDonough test 
and the M c u l t y  of applying it in a consistent manner to the 
post-trial determination of whether a juror's nondisclosure 
during voir dire resulted in prejudicial bias. Part I1 of this Note 
reviews McDonough and the two-pronged test it established. 
Part I11 examines the facts and reasoning of Thomas. Part IV 
analyzes the Utah Supreme Court's various applications of the 
McDonough test to Thomas and proposes a "safety net" policy 
which would allow courts to rule in favor of the party request- 
ing a new trial when faced with the occasional extreme case in 
which the established tests cannot satisfactorily resolve ques- 
tions concerning the fairness of the trial process. 
6. 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992). 
7. Although McDonough was a civil case, the test has been applied to crimi- 
nal trials. See Ian C. Wiener & Jeff E. Schwartz, hoject, Tzuentieth Annual Review 
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989- 
1990: Right to Jury Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 982, 999 n.1777 (1991). Some criminal 
cases applying McDonough include United States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780 (11th 
Cir. 1985), and United States v. McMahan, 744 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court could not abrogate any right the defendant might 
have to a new trial under McDonough; however, state rules and statutes, as well 
as state concerns regarding judicial eamomy, allow the court the freedom to estab- 
lish its own rules expanding a party's right to a new trial. 
8. 830 P.2d at  244. 
9. Id. at  248-49 (opinion of Durham, J.); zd. a t  249 (Stewart, J., concurring 
in the result); id. at  252 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). 
10. Id. at 245-49 (opinion of Durham, J.); id. at  249-50 (Stewart, J., concur- 
ring in the result); id. at 250 (Zimmeman, J., concurring in the result); id. a t  250- 
52 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). 
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A. Facts and Holding 
McDonough involved a products liability action arising 
from an accident in which a riding mower ran over a child, 
causing the loss of both feet." During voir dire, plaintiffs' 
counsel asked prospective jurors whether they or any of their 
family members had sustained any accidental injury resulting 
in prolonged suffering or disability.'' One juror did not re- 
spond to this question, even though his son had once suffered a 
broken leg, because the juror did not believe that his son's 
injury resulted in extended suffering or disability.13 After the 
jury ruled in defendant's favor, the plaintiffs approached the 
juror with the trial court's permission and moved for a new 
trial.14 The trial court denied the motion, but was never in- 
formed of the results of the interview with the juror? The 
plaintiffs appealed the judgment, claiming that their right to 
invoke peremptory challenges had been prejudiced by the 
juror's silence? The Tenth Circuit agreed and ordered a new 
trial." The defendants appealed, and in an opinion written by 
Justice Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 
After acknowledging that harmless-error rules incorporate 
the principle that "courts should . . . ignore errors that do not 
affect the essential fairness of the trial,"18 the Court held that 
a new trial was not required in McDonough unless the juror's 
nondisclosure "denied respondents their right to an impartial 
jury."lg The Court then set forth a two-pronged test for deter- 
mining when a juror's failure to disclose information during 
voir dire requires a new trial.20 
11. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 US. 548, 549, 558 n.* 
(1984). 
12. Id. at 549-50. 
13. Id. at 550, 555. 
14. Id. at 550-51. 
15. Id. at 551. 
16. Id. 
17. Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 687 F.2d 338, 342-43 (10th 
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 464 U.S. 548 (1984). 
18. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 
750, 759-60 (1946)). 
19. Id. at 549. 
20. See infra part 1I.B. In deciding the McDomugh case, the courts treated 
the juror's silence as an answer to voir dire questioning. McDomugh, 464 U.S. at  
551-52. Factors for determining whether silence constitutes a response are found in 
McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1981). If a juror's silence dem- 
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B. The McDonough Test 
The McDonough test replaced the more subjective standard 
used by the Tenth Circuit, which required a new trial whenev- 
er a juror failed to disclose information that would have provid- 
ed evidence of a probable bias, if such information would have 
been disclosed by an average juror.21 The Supreme Court em- 
phasized that trial error should not automatically be grounds 
for a new trial,22 and declared the standard used by the Tenth 
Circuit to be "contrary to the practical necessities of judicial 
management."z3 This statement finds support in Rule 61 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurez4 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2111:~ which emphasize that trial error does not require a 
new trial unless a party's substantial rights have been affected. 
The first prong of the McDonough test requires proof that 
a juror "failed to answer honestly a material question on uoir 
dire."26 The plain language of this prong does not differentiate 
between a juror's intentional or knowing dishonesty and a 
juror's inadvertent but mistaken response or nondisclosure. 
However, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that 
although "[tlhe motives for concealing information may 
vary, . . . only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality 
can truly be said to  affect the fairness of a trial."27 This 
statement implies that bias cannot be presumed from a juror's 
onstrates failure to answer honestly a material question, the nondisclosure consti- 
tutes juror misconduct which may require a new trial, depending on the extent to 
which the nondisclosure affected the fairness of the trial. See McDonough, 464 U.S. 
at 549, 556. 
21. Greenwood, 687 F.2d at 343. This standard protected a party's right to 
exercise peremptory challenges based upon the possibility of juror bias. 
22. McDonough, 464 US. at 553. 
23. Id. at 555-56. 
24. This rule requires that a party's substantial rights be affected in order to 
justify a new trial: 
No error . . . or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a 
new trial or for setting aside a verdict . . . unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court 
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
FED. R. CW. P. 61. 
25. This statute provides that, "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of cer- 
tiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the re- 
cord without regard to errors or defects which do not affed the substantial rights 
of the parties." 28 U.S.C. 8 2111 (1988). 
26. McDomugh, 464 US. at 556. 
27. Id. 
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nondisclosure, but that an appellant must prove that the fail- 
ure to disclose rendered the juror unfit for jury service; conse- 
quently, there may be situations in which a court must probe 
the juror's mental state.28 
The second prong of the McDonough test requires proof 
that an honest response would have provided grounds for a 
challenge for cause.2g The Court explicitly declined to extend 
this prong to  the possible exercise of a peremptory challenge. 
Justice Rehnquist stated that "it ill serves the important end of 
finaity to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the perempto- 
ry challenge process because counsel lacked an item of informa- 
tion which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on 
voir dire exa~nination."~~ 
In his concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens and 
O'Connor, Justice Blackmun specifically stated it was his un- 
derstanding that the Court's decision did not "foreclose the 
normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting 
that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury.'"' Jus- 
tice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote an opinion 
concurring in the judgment only." Under his analysis, "the 
proper focus when ruling on a motion for new trial in this sit- 
uation should be on the bias of the juror and the resulting 
prejudice t o  the litigant."33 Justice B r e ~ a n  argued that a 
new trial should be awarded if a "juror incorrectly responded to  
a material question on voir dire, and [ifJ, under the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the particular case, the juror was 
28. David Crump, Peremptory Challenges After McDonough Power Equipment, 
Inc. v. Greenwood: A Problem of Fairness, Finality, and Falsehood, 69 OR. L. REV. 
741, 772 (1990). According to Crump, this type of inquiry into the juror's mental 
state could 'lengthen hearings, make outcomes depend more heavily upon vague 
inferences from diffise evidence, and increase juror harassment." Id. However, 
Crump believes that the McDonough test's requirement of dishonesty in a response 
to questioning, wherein a juror intends to mislead the court or knows the given 
response did mislead the court, should be retained in any modification of the test. 
Crump's reason for adhering to this requirement is that mistaken juror respons- 
es-such as those resulting from mistake, ineffective communication, or a juror's 
imperfect knowledge or understanding-are almost always found in "fair-but-im- 
perfect trials." Id. at 772-73. Furthermore, the requirement of dishonesty provides 
an incentive for voir dire questioning to be brief, clear, and focused "on the most 
likely sources of bias." Id. at 773. 
29. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556. 
30. Id. at 555. 
31. Id. at 556 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
32. Id. at 557 (Breman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
33. Id. 
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biased against the moving litigant."34 Brennan's standard 
would not limit a new trial to those situations in which the 
juror intentionally gives an incorrect or dishonest answer dur- 
ing voir dire; according to Justice Brennan, "[olne easily can 
imagine cases in which a prospective juror provides what he 
subjectively believes to be an honest answer, yet that same 
answer is objectively incorrect and therefore suggests that the 
individual would be a biased juror in the particular case."35 
Taking all the opinions in McDonough as a whole, every 
Justice agreed in the result and determined that the trial 
court, not the court of appeals, should have decided the new 
trial question? Furthermore, five Justices argued in concur- 
rences that trial courts should have the discretion to infer bias 
from the facts and circumstances of the case despite a juror's 
 honest^.^' This suggests that a majority of the Court did not 
favor the McDonough test as an exclusive test of impartiality. 
It appears that, when challenging a decision on the basis of 
juror nondisclosure, the McDonough test is required only when 
bias cannot be shown. 
In addressing a party's right to an impartial jury, the 
McDonough test focuses on the issue of juror bias sufficient to 
justify a challenge for cause. "[Hlints of bias not sufficient to  
warrant challenge for cause,"38 although they might influence 
a litigant's decision to  exercise a peremptory challenge,sg do 
not automatically justify rever~al.4~ 
34. Id. at 557-58 (Breman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
35. Id. at 559 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
36. Id. at 556, 557. 
37. Id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 557 (Brennan, J., concur- 
ring in the judgment). 
38. Id. at 554. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 555-56. Other courts have also used the "presumed bias" reasoning 
of the concurring opinions in McDonough. Crump, supm note 28, at 762 n.114, 
cites several cases which were decided by using the less rigid reasoning of the 
concurring opinions in McDonough rather than that of the majority opinion. See, 
e.g., United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989) (remanding for hearing 
when &davit charged juror with nondisclosure at voir dire because she wanted to 
serve on the jury); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing 
conviction by applying presumed bias reasoning to reverse district court's finding of 
juror's sincerity in nondisclosure). 
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111. STATE V. THOMAS: THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S 
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE MCDONOUGH TEST 
A. Facts 
In State v. Thomas:' defendant Thomas appealed his con- 
viction of rape, alleging four counts of trial error. One assign- 
ment of error was "that the failure of two jurors to correctly 
respond to a question during voir dire denied him a fair trial by 
an impartial During voir dire, the judge asked pro- 
spective jurors whether they or any close relatives had ever 
been the victim of a violent crime, and whether they or any 
close relatives had ever been accused of any offense similar to 
the rape charge against ThomasP3 Juror Salaz, who had pre- 
viously been assaulted, and juror Wall, who had told police that 
her husband had sexually assaulted her son, remained silent 
and did not inform the judge of these experiences." 
Thomas claimed that during jury deliberation, the other 
jurors learned of Salaz's and Wall's undisclosed experiencesp5 
and coerced Salaz and Wall into changing their votes from not 
guilty to  guilty by threatening to reveal their misconduct dur- 
ing voir dire.46 Thomas also argued that the nondisclosures 
had prevented him from excusing the jurors on challenges for 
cause or peremptory challenges, and that he had therefore been 
deprived of his right to  an impartial jury4' Despite Thomas's 
assertions, the trial judge refused to admit post-trial evidence 
regarding these allegations on the ground that it would con- 
stitute "an intrusion on the deliberative process of the jury, in 
violation of rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of E~idence."~~ 
41. 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989). 
42. Id. at 447. 
43. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). 
44. Id. at 244. 
45. Id. at 244, 247. 
46. Id. 
47. 777 P.2d at  450. The Utah Constitution guarantees defendants the right 
to a speedy trial by an impartial jury. UTAH CONST. art. I, 5 12. 
48. 777 P.2d at 447. Rule 60603) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states the fol- 
lowing: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the 
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or 
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to 
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental 
processes in co~ec t ion  therewith, except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
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On Thomas's first appeal, the Utah Supreme Court re- 
manded the case to  the trial court to  determine whether Thom- 
as could prove that both prongs of the McDonough test had 
been ~atisfied.~' On remand, the trial judge denied Thomas's 
motion for a new trial after holding an evidentiary hearing.s0 
The judge found that the first prong of the McDonough 
test-that a prospective juror failed to answer honestly a mate- 
rial question during voir dire-was not satisfiedesl The judge 
apparently believed that neither juror had intended her silence 
to mislead the and again refused to admit any evi- 
dence showing jury misconduct during deliberati~n.~~ Thomas 
appealed a second time, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded for a new triales4 
B. Reasoning 
1. The court's application of the McDonough test's first prong 
Although the court found juror Wall had not intended to  
deceive the court by failing to disclose that she had charged her 
husband with sexually assaulting her son,55 it determined 
that Wall's nondisclosure satisfied the first prong of the 
McDonough test because "she nonetheless failed to answer a 
material question ac~urately."~~ Justice Durham considered 
the possibility that Wall may not have perceived any similarity 
between her husband's alleged sexual assault on her son and 
the crime of rape.s7 In Durham's view, this was one of those 
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was im- 
properly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or 
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which 
the juror would be precluded from testifjing be received for these purpos- 
es. 
UTAH R. EVID. 60603). 
49. 777 P.2d at 451. 
50. 830 P.2d at 244. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 245. 
53. Id. at 244. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 245-46. 
56. Id. at 246. The dissent in Thomas, written by Associate Chief Justice 
Howe and joined by Chief Justice Hall, maintained that the first prong of the 
McDonough test had not been met for juror Wall since no evidence was submitted 
to prove that the charge against Wall's husband of sexually assaulting her son was 
a crime of violence rather than "a nonconsensual touching or fondling unaccompa- 
nied by violence." Id. at 251 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). 
57. Id. at 246. 
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"easily imagine[dIn cases where subjective belief was unreason- 
able. Relying upon the objective perspective proposed by 
Brennan? Justice Durham stated "there are obvious similari- 
ties between a sexual assault and a rapeYsg and argued that 
Wall's intent or lack of intent to  deceive the court was irrele- 
vant; her failure to accurately answer a material question dur- 
ing voir dire was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the 
McDonough test.60 
As to juror Salaz, her testimony during the evidentiary 
hearing showed that "[slhe knew that she had been a victim of 
a violent crime and, substituting her judgment for that of court 
and counsel, decided that she could be impartial and did not 
need to disclose the inf~rmation."~' Justice Durham held that, 
in accordance with the court's past decisions, "the trial court, 
not the juror, must determine a juror's  qualification^."^ The 
court found that Salaz's nondisclosure also satisfied the first 
prong of the McDonough test since "Salaz's subjective impres- 
sion that she could be fair and impartial [did] not overcome the 
fact that she had been a victim of a violent crime and failed t o  
disclose that fact during voir dire."3 For these reasons, the 
court held that the trial judge had been clearly erroneous in 
- - 
ruling that the first prong of the McDonough test had not been 
met.64 
2. McDonough's second prong: Four different views 
The Utah Supreme Court justices were signifkantly divid- 
ed over the application of the second prong of the McDonough 
test and their understanding of its effect on the facts of Thom- 
as. Justice Durham modified the second prong of the test in 
order to justify a new trial.65 Justices Stewart and 
Zimmerman concurred in remanding the case for a new trial, 
but disagreed with Justice Durham's extension of the 
McDonough test's second prong; each gave different reasons for 
58. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
59. 830 P.2d at 246. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 246-47. 
62. Id. at 247. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 245. In the dissent, Associate Chief Justice Howe and Chief Justice 
Hall favored a subjective analysis for determining juror dishonesty. Id. at 251 
(Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 247-49 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
1356 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNTVERSITY LAW REVIEW 11993 
determining that a new trial was required.66 The dissent ar- 
gued that application of the unaltered McDonough test did not 
justify a new trial.67 
a. Justice Durham's opinion. Under the second prong of 
the McDonough test, Thomas could not have been granted a 
new trial unless he proved that the jurors' honest answers to 
the voir dire questions would have been grounds for challenges 
for cause? Justice Durham believed that Thomas could not 
do so because "there [was] no record establishing a basis for 
this challenge, nor [was] there any way to  show that proper 
disclosure by the jurors would have created such a basis."' 
In accordance with the "outside influence" exception to rule 
606(b),?' Thomas had also tried to show he had been preju- 
diced by the jury's use of Wall's and Salaz's  nondisclosure^.^^ 
Since the alleged prejudice did not originate from any bias of 
the two jurors who failed to answer honestly the questions at 
voir dire, Thomas sought to prove that prejudice resulted from 
the reactions of Wall and Salaz to the coercive behavior of their 
fellow jurors, who "threat[ened] to  reveal their misc~nduct."'~ 
Justice Durham argued that the trial judge's refusal to  admit 
evidence of the jury's "prejudicial use of the voir dire-related 
information during jury deliberations" prevented Thomas from 
proving the existence of this prejudice." 
For these reasons, Justice Durham concluded that the 
second prong of the McDonough test could not be satisfied for 
either Wall or Sa la~ .?~  In order to address the situation pre- 
sented by Thomas's case, Justice Durham modified the second 
prong of the test "to require a showing that a correct response 
would have provided either a valid basis for a challenge for 
cause or that the nondisclosure itself prevented the juror from 
serving as a fair, impartial fa~tfinder."~~ To satisfy this modi- 
66. Id. at 249-50 (Stewart, J., & Zirnmerman, J., concurring in th~-result). 
67. Id. at 250-52 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). 
68. Id. at 245 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
69. Id. at 247 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
70. See supra note 48. 
71. 830 P.2d at 247. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 248-49 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
74. Id. at 247-49 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
75. Id. at 248 (opinion of Durham, J.). Modification of the Supreme Court's 
McDomugh test is not unprecedented. In United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 
(11th Cir. 1984), a defendant convicted of both obstruction of justice and conspiracy 
to obstruct justice was granted a new trial based upon a juror's dishonest answers 
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fied prong of the test, Thomas could introduce evidence that 
jury misconduct relating to  the nondisclosures at voir dire oc- 
curred during jury deliberati~n.~~ Even though the trial judge 
had refused to  admit such evidence, Justice Durham thought 
"[elvidence that the undisclosed information was used during 
deliberations should be admissible under the provision of rule 
606(b) allowing testimony on the question 'whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to  bear upon any juror.' "77 
Justice Durham apparently felt justified in departing from 
the policy favoring secrecy in jury deliberations when juror 
misconduct during voir dire results in misconduct by other 
jurors during deliberations. Although she acknowledged that 
"harassment, pressure, or  intimidation from other jurors is not 
a basis for impeaching a verdi~t,"~' she then argued that this 
traditional rule should be different "[wlhere the pressure is 
based on the other jurors' improper use of a juror's misconduct 
during voir dire" because such a situation implicates "the fair- 
ness of the trial process."7s Justice Durham would have re- 
manded for trial court proceedings under her new test, but 
since no other justice joined her proposed modification, she con- 
curred in remanding the case for a new trial.80 
b. Justice Stewart's opinion. Although Justice Stewart 
agreed that a new trial was required, he did not believe that "a 
jury verdict should be impeachable on the basis of what was 
said during the jury's deliberations."'' He supported the rever- 
sal of Thomas's conviction because, if Wall and Salaz had re- 
sponded honestly to the voir dire questioning, their answers 
would have been grounds for peremptory challenges and possi- 
bly challenges for cause.82 
to voir dire. The Eleventh Circuit resolved the McDonough test's second prong 
requirement--that an honest response would have provided a basis for a challenge 
for cause-by quoting Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in McDonough, not the 
plurality opinion. Justice Blackmun's concurrence stated that "in most cases, the 
honesty or dishonesty of a juror's response is the best initial indicator of whether 
the juror in fact was impartial." Id. at 1532 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., 
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Note, 
however, that while McDonough is wholly binding authority on the Eleventh Cir- 
cuit, only its constitutional requirements are binding on the Utah Supreme Court. 
76. 830 P.2d at 248 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
77. Id at 249 (opinion of Durham, J.) (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 606(b)). 
78. Id. at 247 n.2 (opinion of Durham, J.) (citations omitted). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 249 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
81. Id. at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
82. Id. 
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c. Justice Zirnmerman's opinion. Justice Zimmerman 
agreed with Justice Stewart's criticism of the modification 
proposed by Justice Durham, but felt that the original 
McDonough test was sufficient to determine whether a new 
trial should be granted.83 Justice Zimmerman argued that a 
basis for a challenge for cause would have been found had Wall 
and Salaz given honest responses to the voir dire questions, 
because another potential juror in Thorns had been excused 
for cause after disclosing an experience involving assault." 
Justice Zimmerman interpreted "basis" to mean creating "a 
prima facie case for a motion to disqualify for cause,"85 or tak- 
ing the undisclosed answer alone, without regard to what the 
trial court might have learned from follow-up questions.86 Jus- 
tice Zimmerman recognized that, "after the fad, the jurors may 
state that they still could have judged the case impartially," 
but felt that "such retrospective second-guessing" was inappro- 
priate and not required by M~Donough.~' 
d. The dissent. Associate Chief Justice Howe, joined by 
Chief Justice Hall, disagreed with the analyses of Justices 
Durham, Stewart, and Zimmerman. In rejecting Justice 
Durham's extension of the second prong of the McDonough test, 
Justice Howe maintained that admitting affidavits of jurors 
relating details of the jury's deliberations would violate rule 
606(b) of the Utah Rules of Eviden~e .~~  He claimed that the 
test in its original form was "eminently fair to both the prose- 
cution and the defe~~dant."~' 
In his dissent, Justice Howe argued that Thomas's convic- 
tion should have been a r m e d  and that no new trial was war- 
rantedegO He felt that Wall's nondisclosure did not satisfy the 
f i s t  prong of the McDonough test because the sexual assault 
Wall had accused her husband of perpetrating on her son may 
83. Id. at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). 
84. Id. The potential juror told the court that she had been the victim of a 
sexual assault, and indicated that she might have difficulty remaining impartial. 
Brief for Appellant at 15, State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) (No. 890503); 
cf. infra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining that a juror whose brother had 
been the victim of a violent assault had not, a h r  follow-up questioning, been chal- 
lenged for cause, and was allowed to serve on the jury). 
85. 830 P.2d at  250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 252 (Howe, Assoc. CJ., dissenting). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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not have been a violent crime.g1 As Justice Howe argued, "[aln 
assault can be a nonconsensual touching or fondling unaccom- 
panied by ~iolence."'~ For this reason, Justice Howe did not 
find clearly erroneous the trial judge's determination that Wall 
had responded h~nestly.'~ 
Although Justice Howe agreed that the fvst prong of the 
McDonough test had been met in regard t o  Salaz, he main- 
tained that "a challenge for cause against Salaz would not have 
been ~ustained."'~ In support of this position, he stated that, 
We have held in many cases that a prospective juror is not 
subject to a challenge for cause because he or she may harbor 
preconceived notions, feelings, or ideas which will fairly yield 
to the evidence t o  be presented. Particularly is that true when 
the juror, without being "pushed" by the court, indicates his 
or her willingness to do so." 
Supporting this argument is the fact that another juror, who 
had disclosed the facts of his brother's murder by an unknown 
assailant but who nonetheless asserted his ability to serve 
impartially, was not challenged for ~ause. '~ 
3. Reconciling the opinions in Thomas 
The confusion in Thomas may be attributed to  a result- 
oriented approach. However, the opinions can be substantially 
reconciled. First, a majority of the court agreed to apply the 
unaltered version of the McDonough test's second prong.97 
Second, a majority consisting of a different grouping of justices 
found that the facts of Thomas satisfied some variant of the 
second prong." Third, a majority of the justices apparently 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
2, Stalx 
account 
Id. at 251 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 251-52 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting); see also Brief for Appellee at 
v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) (No. 890503) (giving a more detailed 
of this juror's history and the decision to allow him to serve on the jury); 
supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that another pot&tial 
juror had been excused for cause after telling the court that she had been the 
victim of a crime of violence). 
97. 830 P.2d at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); id. at 250-51 
(Howe, Assoc. C.J., joined by Hall, C.J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 249 (opinion of Durham, J.); id. at 249-50 (Stewart, J., concurring 
in the result); id. at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). 
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felt that the facts of Thomas did not satisfy the second prong if 
the phrase "valid basis" considers more than just the omitted 
response.gg Taken together, the opinions limit the unaltered 
second prong to  consideration of whether the omitted response, 
if unrebutted, would justify a juror's disqualification for cause. 
While only Justice Zimmerman took this position,'" his ap- 
proach provides the narrowest possible grounds on which the 
court's opinions could rest. lo' 
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
The Thomas decision involves two separate issues. The 
first issue, which McDonough adequately addresses, asks when 
juror dishonesty or nondisclosure during voir dire requires a 
new trial. The second issue, which McDonough did not address, 
asks when-if ever-jury misconduct during deliberation, when 
prompted by juror misconduct during voir dire, requires a new 
trial. 
The McDonough test deals with juror misconduct during 
voir dire that prejudices a party's ability to  wisely exercise a 
challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge. Under the 
McDonough test, juror dishonesty at voir dire requires a new 
trial only when it affects a party's substantial rights and would 
have provided sficient grounds for a challenge for cause. 
In Thomas, a question arose as to  whether Wall's and 
Salaz's nondisclosures at voir dire concealed juror bias which 
would have justified a challenge for cause. However, apparently 
neither juror was actually biased against Thomas because both 
initially voted to find him not Any prejudice arising 
99. Id. at 247 (opinion of Durham, J.) (arguably implying by her "no record" 
discussion that the test might not be satisfied if more than the omitted response 
were considered); id. at 251-52 (Howe, Assoc. C.J., joined by Hall, C.J., dissenting) 
(discussing other jurors not excused after follow-up questioning). 
100. Id. at 250 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). Note that Justice 
Durham's "no record" discussion might also suggest a reluctance to second-guess 
what might have followed disclosure, had it been made. Id. at 247 (opinion of 
Durham, J.). Note also that Justice Stewart, in stating that "the answers, if truly 
given, m a y  not have been a ground for a challenge for cause," did not foreclose the 
possibility that the nondisclosures justified a challenge for cause. Id. at 249 (Stew- 
art, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added). 
101. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (When a fragment- 
ed Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .' ") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 11.15 (1976)). 
102. 830 P.2d at 247, 248. 
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from their misconduct during voir dire did not manifest itself in 
any predetermined verdict on their part; instead, it resulted 
when other jurors used their knowledge of the nondisclosures 
to influence Wall's and Salaz's votes.lo3 
Because the pressure applied to Wall and Salaz was based 
on the other jurors' knowledge of Wall's and Salaz's misconduct 
during voir dire, the McDonough test might appear relevant to, 
although not dispositive of, the situation. However, a juror's 
testimony concerning events that occur during the deliberative 
process falls under rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evi- 
dence? The conflicting opinions in Thomas are the result of 
the Utah Supreme Court's attempt to apply both the 
McDonough test and rule 606(b) to this situation. 
A. The Square Peg-Round Hole Dilemma 
Does juror misconduct at voir dire constitute "an outside 
influence" or "extraneous prejudicial information7' affecting jury 
deliberation? If so, evidence that such information was used 
during deliberation should be admissible under the exception to 
rule 606(b).lo5 If not, the evidence is inadmissible because it 
"would constitute an impermissible intrusion into the delibera- 
tive process of the jury."'06 The Thomas court struggled t o  de- 
termine just how relevant the McDonough test was-or should 
be-in resolving this question. 
B. Justice Durham's Extension of McDonough 
Adopting Justice Durham's modification of the McDonough 
test could result in a multitude of problems and uncertainties. 
Determining whether "the nondisclosure itself prevented the 
juror from serving as a fair, impartial fa~tfinder"'~' would ne- 
cessitate inquiry into the juror's performance of jury duties. 
The search for juror bias would extend beyond pre-trial proce- 
dures to the trial itself, intrude upon the jury's deliberative 
process, and continue long after the trial's conclusion. While 
Justice Durham sought to protect "the fairness of the trial pro- 
c e ~ s , " ' ~ ~  allowing a party to inquire into a juror's impartiality 
103. Id. 
104. See supra note 48. 
105. See supra note 48. 
106. 830 P.2d at 248 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 247 n.2 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
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to such an extent would also affect the fairness of the trial pro- 
cess. 
A delicate balance exists between the need for fmality of 
verdicts and the interest in providing a fair trial. While the 
parties, and society, must be able to  rely on the finality of a 
verdict, finality also relates to  the concept of a fair trial. One 
commentator has persuasively argued that, 
If a verdict is impeached and the judgment set aside, it may 
be years before the case is retried . . . . As time passes, memo- 
ries fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is often 
lost . . . . Due to these problems, it is uncertain whether a 
later retrial is likely to result in a just verdict.'" 
On the other hand, "if a verdict is the result of threats against 
jurors, outside or erroneous information provided to  jurors, or 
other improper influences, the parties have not received the 
just and impartial verdict to  which they are entitled."l1° 
Although the McDonough test was properly applied in 
Thomas to discover whether Wall or Salaz acted improperly 
during voir dire, the test was not intended to  resolve the ques- 
tion of whether a new trial should be granted based upon jury 
misconduct during deliberation. In seeking to  ensure the fair- 
ness of one aspect of the trial process, courts should be wary of 
compromising the fairness of the trial process in other aspects. 
C. Justice Stewart's Extension of McDonough 
Rather than undermining the "long-established policy of 
the law t o  keep jury deliberations both secret and sacro- 
sanct,""' Justice Stewart chose to modify the test in a man- 
ner which granted a new trial because the jurors' 
nondisclosures deprived Thomas of his right to exercise pe- 
109. James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: T a ~ e r  v. United States 
and Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 389, 402-03 (1991). 
The need for finality is a generally recognized principle. "[Tlhe setting aside of 
jury verdicts on any but the most egregious grounds would cost more in terms of 
stability and finality than it could possibly gain." Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, 
Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Prin- 
ciple of Rule 606@) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 534 (1988). However, Crump 
concedes that "an exclusionary rule preventing proof of serious misconduct, or a 
rule preventing the investigation that would discover it, would be dysfunctional." 
Id. at 535. 
110. Diehm, supra note 109, at 403-04. 
111. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
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remptory  challenge^."^ Justice Stewart's modification of the 
McDonough test grants a new trial if a nondisclosing juror's 
honest response to voir dire questioning would have been 
grounds for a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge. 
This would create a standard similar to that used by the Tenth 
Circuit,ll3 prior to  the establishment of the McDonough test, 
in which the unrevealed information is so significant that coun- 
sel is "entitled to know of it in deciding how to  use . . . peremp- 
tory  challenge^.""^ In Thomas, Justice Stewart argued that, 
The questions put to the jurors which were incorrectly an- 
swered were clearly material and potentially of great impor- 
tance to an attorney's making a rational decision as  to how to 
exercise peremptory challenges. Although it is true that the 
answers, if truly given, may not have been a ground for a 
challenge for cause, peremptory challenges are nonetheless an 
essential and important part of choosing a jury.l15 
Had Wall and Salaz responded honestly to the voir dire 
questions, Thomas's attorney would probably have questioned 
them further concerning their past experiences. Depending 
upon their answers to more extensive questioning, it is certain- 
ly possible that the defense would have attempted to excuse 
both jurors by exercising either challenges for cause or peremp- 
tory challenges. The defense should have had that opportunity. 
Justice Stewart's proposed modification of the test is simi- 
lar to  that suggested by Professor David Crump. According to  
Crump, the McDonough test "fails to  recognize how a juror's 
frustration of the peremptory challenge process can lead to 
unfairness in the trial."116 Crump's proposal retains the first 
112. Id. 
113. "If an average prospective juror would have disclosed the information, and 
that information would have been significant and cogent evidence of the juror's 
probable bias, a new trial is required to rectify the failure to disclose it." Green- 
wood v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 687 F.2d 338, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 
464 U.S. 548 (1984). 
114. Id. at 342. 
115. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 249 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (citing 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988)). The two types of challenges are 
discussed in McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1981). 'While chal- 
lenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and 
legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or 
imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable." Id. at  657-58 
(quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 
U.S. 68, 70 (1887))). 
116. Crump, supra note 28, at  764. Crump claims that Justice Rehnquist's 
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prong of the original test-that "a party must . . . demonstrate 
that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on 
voir dire9'"'-but modifies the second prong so that a new tri- 
al may be granted if "the average attorney of reasonable skill 
would have been particularly likely to exercise a peremptory 
challenge if provided with correct  answer^.""^ This proposal 
is more generous than the McDonough test in recognizing the 
role of the peremptory challenge in selecting an impartial jury, 
but is still sufficiently vague enough to cause inconsistent re- 
sults. 
D. The Combined Effect of the Opinions in Thomas 
Justice Zimmerman's prima facie case analysis requires a 
new trial if the unrebutted nondisclosure would have justified 
disqualification for cause. Since, absent rebuttal, the jurors 
would have been dismissed had they answered honestly, this 
analysis requires a new trial. If this rule properly reconciles 
the Justices' opinions, Thorns protects parties from jurors' 
after-the-fact assurances of impartiality-assurances sought by 
judges anxious to avoid repeating a trial. The prohibition on 
using impartiality declared after the fact to deny a new trial is 
similar to  the prohibition on using hints of bias to  justify grant- 
ing a new trial. 
E. The Safety Net 
In effect, the McDonough test states that, when the lack of 
an honest response to voir dire questioning results from a 
juror's nondisclosure or inadvertent mistake, a party's substan- 
tial rights are not affected by the deprivation of any opportuni- 
second prong of the McDonough test, requiring a finding that "a correct response 
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause," McDonough Power 
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984), would often "preserve some 
verdicts that many would find too glaringly unfair to tolerate." Crump, supra note 
28, 
Id. 
at 774. Crump finds that the concurring opinions in McDonough 
propose too diffuse a standard in focusing merely on the bias of the juror 
and the resulting prejudice to the litigant. By grounding this standard 
upon multiple unspecified fadors, these Justices would encourage hearings 
in marginal cases, cause an undue number of unproductive retrials, 
lengthen hearings, produce unpredictable results, and increase juror ha- 
rassment. 
at 774-75. 
117. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). 
118. Crump, supra note 28, at 775. 
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ty to exercise a peremptory challenge. This seems unjust, since 
the inability to  exercise a peremptory challenge in such a situa- 
tion might well compromise the essential fairness of a trial. 
The McDonough test seeks to provide fairness in the trial pro- 
cess without creating judicial inefficiency. Had a less rigid 
standard been applied to Thorns, a new trial could have been 
ordered without intruding upon the jury's deliberative process 
to impeach the verdict or interpreting and manipulating the 
McDonough test in order to resolve the issue before the court. 
The conflicting analyses and results of the Utah Supreme 
Court justices in Thomas illustrate that the McDonough test 
was not designed to address a situation involving such unusual 
circumstances. Confusion and inconsistency will necessarily 
occur when the courts attempt to force a square peg into a 
round hole. Efforts to  resolve the occasional extreme case by 
applying tests and standards which cannot encompass the facts 
of the case are more likely to frustrate rather than administer 
justice. Although a defendant is "not entitled to perfection in 
the trial the courts should provide a "safety net" 
for the occasional extreme case in which questions concerning 
the fairness of the trial process cannot be satisfactorily resolved 
by established tests. When a court's reasonable efforts are 
insufficient to conclusively establish that a party's substantial 
rights have not been affected by trial error, the courts should 
adopt a policy of ruling in favor of the moving party.120 
Tests and standards are created to  address issues which 
arise with some regularity. Most cases can be adequately re- 
- solved by the application of an established test. For these rea- 
sons, the safety net policy will not need to be used often. How- 
ever, when a case presents facts which cannot be clearly re- 
solved by a test or standard which would otherwise apply, the 
safety net policy would allow the judicial system to decide a 
case without risking the possibility of compromising the fair- 
ness of the trial process at some other stage of the proceedings. 
This approach protects the integrity of the trial process and, 
119. Commonwealth v. Amirault, 506 N.E.2d 129, 134 (Mass. 1987) (citing 
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)); see also McDonough, 464 
U.S. at 553. 
120. Accord United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating 
that "in criminal cases '[dloubts about the existence of actual bias should be re- 
solved against permitting the juror to serve' ") (quoting United States v. Nell, 526 
F.2d 1223, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
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when necessary, gives the benefit of the doubt to  the moving 
party 
The McDonough test was designed to provide a new trial if 
a juror who responded dishonestly to voir dire questioning 
could have been challenged for cause had an honest response 
been given. The various opinions in Thomas demonstrate the 
difficulties courts have had in attempting to apply this test to  
cases involving juror nondisclosure at voir dire, and in deciding 
whether the "honesty" of a response should be determined from 
a subjective or an objective standard. The Thomas case further 
complicated the successful application of the McDonough test 
by questioning the proper extent of any examination into juror 
bias: should information affecting jury deliberations be scruti- 
nized in order to determine juror prejudice related to  miscon- 
duct at voir dire? 
Unusual cases such as Thorns are the exception rather 
than the rule; however, they cannot be adequately resolved by 
tests established to resolve less problematic situations. In try- 
ing to force a test to fit the facts of the occasional extreme case, 
the courts are seldom able to achieve consistent and predictable 
results, the integrity of the trial process is often compromised, 
and justice is frequently not satisfied. These problems could be 
reduced if the courts would adopt a safety net policy when they 
are unable to satisfactorily resolve questions concerning the 
fairness of the trial process by using an established test or 
standard. The safety net policy would cause courts to rule in 
favor of the party moving for a new trial when it cannot be 
conclusively established that a party's substantial rights have 
not been affected by trial error. 
The trial process is at the very heart of our country's judi- 
cial system. In order to minimize the amount of trial error, 
courts must sometimes take action which, while it may not 
always be the correct result in a given case, will preserve the 
procedures by which we attempt to provide due process of law 
to the accused. The safety net policy proposed in this Note 
would help insure a fair trial even in situations for which es- 
tablished tests are inadequate. 
Lisabeth Joner . 
